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CASE COMMENTS
Contracts: Risk of Unauthorized Use of Credit Card
A department store issuing credit cards sought payment for
purchases made through the unauthorized use of defendant's
stolen credit card. Defendant, through no fault of his own, was
unaware of the card's disappearance. Plaintiff relied on a risk-
shifting clause contained in the application for the credit card,
imposing liability on the holder for all purchases made
through the presentation of the credit card until the issuer re-
ceives notice that the card has been lost or stolen.' The New
York court denied recovery, holding that plaintiff had been
negligent in its duty to protect the credit status of its customer.
Allied Stores of New York, Inc. v. Funderburke, 52 Misc. 2d 872,
277 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1967).
The earliest case dealing with the question of liability for
the unauthorized use of a lost or stolen credit card analogized
the card to a negotiable instrument, holding that the issuer was
protected as a holder in due course.2 This analogy was ex-
pressly refuted shortly thereafter in Lit Brothers v. Haines.3
In Haines, the court was concerned with the liability of the
holder absent a governing agreement; no risk-shifting clause ex-
isted between the holder and the issuer.4 The court denied re-
covery stating that there was an absence of any contractual ele-
1. Specifically the application states that the holder will "pay for
all purchases made by any person presenting the identification plate
which Seller will lend me, until Seller receives my notice by certified
mail that same has been lost or stolen." Allied Stores of New York,
Inc. v. Funderburke, 52 Misc. 2d 872, 873, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8, 10 (N.Y. City
Civ. Ct. 1967).
2. Wanamaker v. Megary, 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Phila. Mun. Ct. 1915).
The court reasoned that the merchant gave value without notice and
was, therefore, a holder in due course of the debt-evidencing saleslip.
The loss of a credit card has also been analogized to the loss of
currency. See generally Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein, 34 Misc. 2d 751, 755,
225 N.Y.S.2d 51, 55 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1962). However, such an analogy is
subject to criticism. When one loses his currency, his loss is limited
to the amount lost. If the holder is liable for subsequent unauthorized
purchases, the loss of a credit card represents an unlimited loss.
3. 98 N.J.L. 658, 121 A. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1923). Even if the credit
card transaction could be analogized to a negotiable instrument, the
true holder would not be liable on the forgery. See generally UNIFom
COMMURCIAL CODE § 3-404.
4. 98 N.J.L. 658, 121 A. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1923). The holder's credit
"coin" was stolen and the loss was not reported to the issuer. Although
it was apparent that the holder knew of the "coin's" disappearance, it
was found that the holder was ignorant of the ability of an imposter to
obtain goods merely by presenting his credit "coin." Id. at 659, 121 A.
at 131. In light of present day sophistication regarding credit cards, it
is questionable whether such a finding could be made today.
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ment on which to hold the holder liable for the fraudulent
purchases.5 Recent authority seems to support this result."
However, these cases do not insure that the holder will not be
held liable in tort or on an implied contract, even in the absence
of an express contractual provision, where he fails to notify the
issuer of the card's loss while knowing of its ability to be used
fraudulently.7 In Gulf Refining Company v. Plotnik,8 defendant
failed to report the loss of his credit card even after receiving
forged invoices at billing.9 Although there was no contract
shifting the risk of unauthorized use of the credit card, the
court held the holder liable for purchases by the thief on the
theory that an implied contract existed between the holder and
the issuer which placed a duty upon the holder to notify the
issuer of the card's fraudulent use.10
To protect themselves issuers have generally included a
risk-shifting clause within the framework of the credit card
agreement. The enforceability of these provisions has been up-
held. In Union Oil Company of California v. Lull," the Oregon
Supreme Court stated that the holder should be bound by the
terms of the risk-shifting provision as they were not unreason-
able.12 In remanding for a new trial the Lull court held er-
roneous the trial court's instruction that defendant-holder would
be excused from liability imposed by the risk-shifting provision
if he exercised prudence in reporting the loss within a reason-
able time.13 The court further stated that the use of due care
by the issuer or merchant 14 regarding the identity of the pur-
5. Id. at 659-60, 121 A. at 131.
6. Thomas v. Central Charge Serv., Inc., 212 A.2d 533 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1965).
7. See Gulf Ref. Co. v. Plotnik, 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P. 1935).
8. 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P. 1935).
9. Id. at 148.
10. Id. at 151.
11. 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960).
12. Id. at 421-23, 349 P.2d at 247-48.
13. Id. at 412, 349 P.2d at 243.
14. Many credit card arrangements involve three parties, the hold-
er, the merchant, and the issuer. Here the issuer pays the merchant for
the invoices while collecting from the holder. It has been held that in
such three-party situations the relationship between the issuer and the
merchant with respect to the invoices is one of assignment and, there-
fore, any defense available to the holder against the merchant is also
available against the collecting issuer. See Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams
Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 367, 186 S.W.2d 790, 794 (1945). For a dis-
cussion of the assignment theory between the issuer and the merchant,
as well as alternative theories, see Note, The Tripartite Credit Card Ar-
rangement: A Legal Infant, 48 CALiF. L. Rav. 459, 473-78 (1960). The
issuer and the merchant may, of course, be the same party.
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chaser 1c was essential to the issuer's recovery; 16 the mere pres-
ence of a risk-shifting clause was not determinative' 7  In
reaching its conclusion the court analogized the risk-shifting
clause imprinted on a credit card to similar provisions contained
in savings passbooks noting that such provisions do not relieve
the bank from using due care to identify the withdrawer in
the interest of protecting the depositor. 8
In the instant case, the New York court recognized that
the risk-shifting provision was enforceable 9 but held that the
terms 20 did not expressly provide for the holder's liability where
he was unaware that the card had been lost or stolen.21 The
court reasoned that since there was no controlling agreement by
which to affix liability between the parties, the decision should
be governed by common law tort principles.22 The court held
that Allied Stores, in allowing two hundred thirty-seven credit
sales for items totaling $2,460 within a thirty-day period, was
15. In Gull Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 186
S.W.2d 790 (1945), the negligence of an issuer was held to be a bar to
his recovery where he extended credit to an inposter-even in the pres-
ence of a risk-shifting provision.
16. 220 Ore. 412, 433, 349 P.2d 243, 252 (1960). The court further
stated that the burden of proof as to the issue of due care rested with
the issuer. Id. at 436, 349 P.2d at 254. This conclusion was adopted by
analogy to negotiable instrument theory that if the instrument is lost or
stolen, the burden is upon the holder to prove that he acquired the in-
strument as a holder in due course. See generally UNIFomVi COMMERCIAL
CODE § 3-307(3).
17. 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243. The court stated that a jury could
conclude that the issuer (merchant) was negligent when the car driven
by the imposter bore license plates of a state different from that shown
on the credit card as the residence of the true holder. See also Gulf
Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945),
where a gas station dealer allowed an imposter, using defendant's lost
or stolen credit card, to charge tires of a size inconsistent with the size
of those on his automobile, two car radios when his automobile already
contained one, and to obtain cash instead of merchandise. The issuer
was denied recovery.
18. Such provisions provide that the bank is not liable to its de-
positor for withdrawals made by imposters presenting the depositor's
passbook unless the bank is notified of the book's loss or theft. See
Kummel v. Germania Say. Bank, 127 N.Y. 488, 28 N.E. 398 (1891);
Commisso v. National City Bank, 174 Misc. 409, 412, 21 N.Y.S.2d 187,
190 (Sup. Ct. 1939). The analogy is not perfect, however, as banks
have, unlike merchants, signature cards with which to verify the sig-
natures of their withdrawers.
19. 52 Misc. 2d at 874, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 11. See Union Oil Co. v.
Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960).
20. See note 1 supra.
21. 52 Misc. 2d at 875, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12.
22. Id. at 877, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
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negligent in its duty to protect the credit status of its customer
and, therefore, could not recover.23
This holding of negligence on the part of the issuer 24 relieves
credit card holders of potentially ruinous liability if they have
acted with due care. If the issuer gives an imposter an excessive
extension of credit between billing dates, he will be denied re-
covery from the holder. Where the issuer has extended only a
normal amount of credit to the imposter between billing dates,
he has not been negligent and may recover such an amount from
the holder.25 Should the issuer extend an unexcessive amount
of credit during successive monthly billing periods, the holder's
liability could become very large, but such could only occur in
the absence of the holder's due care. An inspection by the
holder of his monthly statements and invoices would reveal the
unauthorized purchases and would allow him ample time to
notify the issuer that an imposter was in possession of his
credit card.2 6  Therefore, under the finding in Allied, the
holder can be held liable, in absence of his own negligence, only
for the unexcessive charges during one billing period.
After finding the issuer negligent, the instant court could
have held that such negligence was a defense to the holder's lia-
bility under the risk-shifting provision.2 7 Instead the court found
the provision inapplicable because the holder was unaware of the
card's disappearance and thus it was impossible for him to give
the issuer notice of the loss. Only after this elimination of the
contractual issue did the court conclude that under common
law principles of tort law applicable, plaintiff had established
23. The court argued:
To pursue the plaintiff's position to an absurd end ... depend-
ing upon how quickly plaintiff discovered suspicious sales, a
customer could, without negligence on his part, be chargeable
... for items totaling $10,000 or $100,000 as well as the $2,460
sought here.
52 Misc. 2d at 878, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
24. Id. But see Uni Serv Corp. v. Vitiello, 53 Misc. 2d 396, 278
N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1967), where the holder was held liable
even after the merchant extended credit beyond an agreed limitation
of $250.
25. It is likely that the issuer or merchant, in furtherance of good-
will, would not sue its customer for such a small amount.
26. Similar theory is used in negotiable instruments law where
there is a duty imposed upon the drawer to verify the vouchers returned
by the bank, otherwise the loss which could have been prevented, had
the vouchers been verified, will rest on the drawer. See generally
UNiFORm Coi aacLA CoDe § 4-406.
27. See Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams, 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790
(1945).
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no right to recovery. Although the court's result is consistent
with the policy of not allowing the issuer to contract out of his
own negligence, the reasoning of the court could be fatal to
such a policy. It can be argued that it is implicit in a risk-shift-
ing provision that the holder will be liable until he notifies the
issuer whether or not he was aware of the loss.28 Even if it is
not implicit, a clause would easily be drafted which would ex-
pressly provide for such liability. However, if the court is bas-
ing its decision on the question of negligence only after finding
that no applicable contractual provision controls, the court
could not logically deny recovery to the negligent issuer under
such a redrafted clause. Arguably, it is better to hold that the
negligence of the issuer or merchant is an absolute defense to a
risk-shifting provision thereby preventing recovery by a negli-
gent issuer regardless of the terms contained in his provision.
Writers have proposed that in cases where the holder and
issuer are both found free from any negligence, the holder
should be bound by the risk-shifting provision contained in his
application for, or imprinted on, his credit card.29 However, the
arguments on behalf of such a conclusion are not persuasive.
It is contended that the liability clauses are not unreasonable
as the issuer assumes all risk of loss after notification while the
holder assumes the risk of loss prior to such notice. 30 However,
in a situation where the holder is blameless, as in the instant
case where defendant failed to give notice because he was un-
aware of the card's disappearance, such a statement clearly fails
to give equity to both parties. The holder assumes the risk dur-
ing a period in which, because of his unawareness, he has no
opportunity to protect himself, while the issuer assumes the risk
only after he has been made aware by the holder of the
fraudulent possession and use of the holder's credit card. Upon
notification, the issuer can take steps for his protection. Thus,
the above statement supporting the holder's liability under a
risk-shifting clause is persuasive only when the holder knows
that his credit card has disappeared and he fails to report such
a disappearance. But in such a situation the issue of liability
under the risk-shifting clause is relatively moot, as the holder
has been negligent and the issuer can recover even in the absence
28. See Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 421, 349 P.2d 243, 247
(1960).
29. See 43 N.C.L. REv. 416, 424 (1965); Comment, The Lost Credit
Card: The Liabilities of the Parties, 30 ALBANY L. REv. 79, 89 (1966).
30. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. at 422, 349 P.2d at
247 (1960).
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of the provision. 1 Therefore, the ab ve contention offers little
in support of enforcing the risk-shifting clause.
Another argument put forth by those advocating the en-
forcement of the clause in the absence of negligence by either
party is that the credit card arrangement is of mutual benefit to
both the holder and the issuer and, therefore, it is reasonable
for them to share the risk of uTnauthorized purchases. 32
Undoubtedly the holder derives benefit from the credit card
arrangement, for he can delay payment for a period of days and
effectuate automatic credit through the mere presentation of his
charge card. However, it is questionable whether this benefit is
comparable to that derived by the issuer. One can imagine the
devastating effect on large department stores, oil companies, and
other retailers if credit card arrangements were removed from
their operations. Not only would sales have to be made on a
charge basis solely upon verification of the customer's credit at
each purchase, severely limiting credit retailing in all large
establishments employing hundreds of clerks and serving thou-
sands of customers, but, should an imposter effectuate a charge
on another's open account the merchant alone would suffer the
loss. 33  Thus the merchant, through the credit card arrange-
ment, effectuates identification of customers authorized to
charge goods while at the same time shifting the risk of fraudu-
lent purchases to the customer until he is notified that an
imposter may have the card. In addition to these benefits, the
issuer employing a revolving charge arrangement is receiving
carrying charges well in excess of his costs.3 4 If major enter-
prise wishes to set in motion such a self-benefiting arrangement
likely to cause occasional loss through fraudulent purchases
in the absence of any negligence, then it seems only just that
the enterprise should be held accountable for such loss as an
expense of the scheme.
If such strict liability is too harsh a burden to impose on the
31. Gulf Ref. Co. v. Plotnik, 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P. 1935).
32. See Comment, The Lost Credit Card: Liabilities of the Parties,
30 ALBANY L. REV. 79 (1966).
33. Writers who analyze the merchant's benefit of the credit card
solely as one of marketing through credit sales are not precisely accur-
ate. Credit sales are quite possible without the use of credit cards, as
indeed sales on open account were used prior to the advent of the
credit card. The precise benefit of the card, of course, is to effectuate
immediate identification of one previously approved for credit.
34. An analysis of service charges used in credit card installment
financing is offered in Note, Regulation of Installment Credit Cards, 35
U. Cm. L. REv. 424 (1966).
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issuer, there are several reforms which could be used to give
the holder greater protection than he presently has. The risk-
shifting clause could be enforceable only if it has been properly
brought to the attention of the customer.35 Legislative reform
has been enacted in New York which provides that such
clauses will be enforceable only if they are conspicuously written
or printed on the application or credit card in a size at least
equal to eight point bold type.36 In addition, because the pur-
pose of the credit card is commonly thought to be identification
rather than evidence of any contractual obligation,37 it might
be required that the risk-shifting clause be enforceable only if
it is included in the holder's executed application, as well as on
the reverse side of the card.
To prevent unlimited loss after the theft of a credit card, the
customer could be required to indicate a limit to the amount of
credit he wishes to receive and unless the customer consents to a
greater limitation the issuer would be liable for all fraudulent
purchases made in excess of the limit.38
Moreover, to prevent the card's use by an imposter, credit
cards might be made nontransferable, thereby allowing the is-
suer to refuse credit to one he knows is not the registered holder
of the card. In addition, it could be required that a small photo
of the authorized holder appear on the reverse side of the
charge card for further identification. While many nontransfer-
able cards provide for the holder's signature on the face of the
card to facilitate a comparison of the signature on the card with
that on the sales invoice, such an arrangement is of questionable
value because the imposter in possession of the credit card then
knows the signature of the true holder. In such a circum-
stance the imposter can readily duplicate the signature of the
holder, making himself appear to be the authorized user. For
35. In Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960), the
holder argued he was not bound to the terms imprinted on the reverse
of the card as he was unaware of their existence. The court said, "In
the absence of proof that the terms . . . were put in deceptive form
which would mislead a reasonable person, and that defendant was so
misled, he is bound ... whether or not he read them." Id. at 420, 349
P.2d at 247.
36. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAWS § 512 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
37. See Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 421, 349 P.2d 243, 247
(1960).
38. Such a limitation was contained in a credit card agreement
in Uni Serv Corp. v. Vitiello, 53 Misc. 2d 396, 278 N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1967). Here the holder indicated a limitation of $250 on
a place provided for such a limitation in the agreement. Credit was
extended beyond such a limitation but the holder was held liable.
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